Abstract. The Vaudenay model for RFID privacy from Asiacrypt 2007 suffers from the impossibility to address strong privacy. It has however been shown by Ng et al. at ESORICS 2008 that the impossibility result leads to no practical threat, so that the definition from 2007 may be unnecessarily strong. This paper proposes a slight change in the definition of privacy from the Vaudenay model (Asiacrypt 2007). Then, we show that by adding a plaintext-aware assumption on the public-key cryptosystem, the proposed protocol always achieves strong privacy with our new definitions.
In this paper, we use knowledge extractors from plaintext-aware encryption schemes [4, 5, 6] . Loosely speaking, plaintext-aware encryption schemes are public-key cryptosystems in which the only way for an adversary to produce a valid ciphertext is to choose a plaintext and to encrypt it. So, by reading the adversary's mind, one could extract the corresponding plaintext.
Our contributions. We propose to update the Vaudenay model by changing the definition of the blinder. In short, we allow the blinder to access the random coins used by the adversary so that he could "read his mind" and predict the behavior of the environment as well. This could fix the impossibility result from [34] and [1] . Then, we show by using plaintext aware encryption techniques that Strong privacy can be achieved in our model with the simple protocol (called PKC protocol herein) of [34] . Our result provides strong confidence in the privacy protection deployed by the PKC protocol.
In Appendix, we further show that IND-CCA security is not enough for the PKC protocol to reach strong privacy in the sense that the system may leak some non-simulatable information. To show this, we construct a cryptosystem which is IND-CCA secure but not plaintext-aware.
Preliminaries
A function f (k) is said to be polynomial if there exists a constant n ∈ N such that f (k) is O(k n ). Similarly, f (k) = negl(k) if, for every n ∈ N, f (k) is O(k −n ).
For an algorithm A, A(y;r) → x represents the output after running A on input y with coins r. The view of A, denoted view A , is defined to include all the inputs and random coins of A along with the list of the messages A received. The ability of an algorithm to query an oracle O is denoted A O .
Given two algorithms A 0 and A 1 of same input/output domains, we define a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D and its advantage
with the probability being taken over the random tape of all the algorithms.
A 0 and A 1 are said to be computationally indistinguishable, if for every distinguisher D, we have Adv
Sampling Algorithms. An efficient sampling algorithm for a probability distribution p is a polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm, in k, denoted Samp, that, on input random coins ρ ∈ {0, 1} (k) , with (·) being a polynomial function, outputs vector elements from X such that | Pr ρ [Samp(ρ) = x] − p(x)| = negl(k). We say that a sampling algorithm Samp is inverse-samplable if it is invertible and some conditions on the distributions are fulfilled.
Definition 1 (Inverse-Sampling Algorithm [23] 
A Model for RFID Security and Privacy
Throughout this section, we recall the definitions in the Vaudenay model and our proposed updates. Most of what follows is taken from [34] . An RFID system is defined by a pair of two probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms and one two-party protocol to be executed between the reader and a tag. A first algorithm SetupReader is used to initialize the reader. It creates a pair of secret/public key (sk, pk) (typically, no public-key cryptography is used and pk =⊥). The second algorithm is for the creation of the tags and is SetupTag pk (ID) → (K ID , S ID ), where ID refers to the identifier of the new tag. When the tag is legitimate, the tag secret K ID is stored along with ID in the database; while the tag's initial state S ID is always put inside the tag. An illegitimate tag has no entry in the database. Finally, a polynomial-time interactive protocol between the reader and a tag ID in which the reader ends up with a tape Output and the tag ends up with a tape Output ID completes the definition of an RFID system. By convention, if the protocol fails from the reader's perspective, we set Output =⊥. When the protocol does not feature reader authentication, Output ID is void.
Simple RFID Protocols. We focus on a relevant class of RFID schemes called simple. These are 2-path protocols in which the reader sends a challenge and receives an answer. Then, it looks for a (ID, K ID ) database entry satisfying a predicate Ψ. The found pair identifies the tag and may be updated. It is straightforward to check that simple RFID schemes following Def. 2 satisfy the more general definition from [34] . Fig. 1 represents a simple RFID scheme from [34] which is based on a public-key cryptosystem. In what follows we call it the PKC protocol. In this scheme, the state of the tags is composed of their ID and a uniformly distributed κ-bit string K ID . Upon reception of an α-bit string challenge a, a tag sends the encryption of ID K ID a under the public key pk to the reader. The latter decrypts the received ciphertext using its secret key sk and checks that it is well formed, that a is correctly recovered and that (ID, K) exists in the database.
Adversaries. Adversaries can request the creation of legitimate and illegitimate RFID tags. Furthermore, adversaries have the ability to draw one or more anonymous RFID tags, according to a chosen probability distribution. All interactions with the reader and the drawn tags is controlled by the adversary. Moreover, the adversary has also the ability to tamper with any drawn tag and to retrieve its internal state. After a while, the adversary has also the possibility to release the tag so that it can be drawn again.
Definition 3 (Adversary [34] Namely, it yields 0 when Output =⊥ and 1 otherwise.
-CORRUPT(vtag) → S: return the current state S of the tag T (vtag). It does not return the content of the temporary memory of the tag.
We consider several classes of adversaries. Weak adversaries do not use the CORRUPT interface. Forward adversaries can only use the CORRUPT interface at the end. Namely, no other interface can be used after the CORRUPT one. All other adversaries are Strong adversaries. We clearly have Weak ⊆ Forward ⊆ Strong. Adversaries that do not have access to the side channel information on the output of the protocol, i.e. to the RESULT oracle, are called NARROW. For any class P of adversaries, we define its Narrow counterpart for which we clearly have Narrow-P ⊆ P.
In the sequel, we restrict to adversaries who use distributions to the DRAW-TAG such that, at any step, the table T can be successfully simulated by an algorithm that is only given the view of the adversary as input. That is, we require adversaries to only submit sampling algorithms that are inverse-samplable and allow them to compute a plausible guess for the identity of drawn tags in polynomial-time. For this we introduce a new notion: simulatable adversaries. A )) are indistinguishable. We note that when the adversary only draws one tag at the time (or in general, a vector of logarithmic length), then our restrictions do not affect the original definition as any sampling algorithm over such a set is inverse-samplable. So, we believe that our restriction to simulatable adversaries is harmless.
Definition 4 (Simulatable adversary
Correctness. Basically, correctness formalizes the fact that whenever the reader and a tag ID participate in an undisturbed protocol session, the reader authenticates the tag, that is, it ends up with Output = ID, except with a small negligible probability. We include all malicious behaviors as it was done in [17] . Clearly, the PKC protocol is correct.
Definition 5 (Correctness). A scheme is correct if for any Strong adversary

A, whenever there is a matching conversation between a tag of identity
Security. Security formalizes the fact that no adversary should be able to make the reader accept on a protocol session in which the adversary has been actively involved. Roughly, an RFID scheme is said to be secure if no adversary is able to make a reader protocol instance recognize an uncorrupted tag ID even if she corrupts all the other tags, unless π and the tag have a matching conversation.
It has been shown in [34] that, for the case of a simple RFID scheme, the notion of security reduces to an adversary playing the following game: create (and draw) a single tag ID; use LAUNCH, SENDREADER, SENDTAG; use an oracle who checks the predicate Ψ(sk, ·, ·, ·) on inputs different from ID; end on a final SEND command to complete the instance for the reader and the tag. The adversary wins the simple security game if one protocol instance on the reader identified tag ID but had no matching conversation. If the success probability of any adversary in wining the security experiment is negligible, then the scheme is simply secure. For simple schemes, simple security implies security.
It was shown in [34] that the PKC protocol is secure when the cryptosystem is IND-CCA secure.
When the protocol includes reader authentication, a security notion for the reader, in which the adversary's goal is to make the tag accept the reader, also needs to be defined. This was done in [32] .
Privacy. An RFID scheme is private if no adversary can learn any information about the identity of drawn tags which is non-trivial. The information is trivial if the protocol messages could be simulated without interacting with the tags or reader and without affecting the output of the adversary. The simulation is performed by a process called a blinder.
Definition 6 (Blinder). A blinder B for an adversary A is a polynomial-time algorithm which sees the same view as A (i.e, all the incoming messages and used coins), records all the adversary's Oracle queries and simulates all the
LAUNCH, SENDREADER, SENDTAG, RESULT oracles to A. A blinded adversary A B is an adversary who does not produce any LAUNCH, SENDREADER, SENDTAG, RESULT oracles query but have them simulated by B.
This definition changes from [34] by letting the blinder see the random tape of the adversary. This is a crucial change as the impossibility result in the Vaudenay model came from that adversaries could ask questions to the system for which they knew the answer but such that it could not be simulated. Providing used coins to the blinder allows it to "read the adversary's mind" and simulate the answer from the system. Again, we only introduced that adversaries must be simulatable in this definition. Clearly, all positive results from [34] hold with these new definitions since privacy is defined by some property of form ∀A ∃B, our new adversaries are compatible with the old definition, and old blinders are compatible with the new definition. Namely:
Definition 7 (Privacy
-Weak privacy can be achieved using pseudo-random functions; -The PKC protocol with IND-CCA encryption is Forward private; -The randomized OSK protocol is Narrow-Forward private in ROM.
However, the impossibility of strong privacy may not hold anymore since it is a property of form ∃A ∀B. Actually, we will show that it no longer holds. This is similarly the case for the impossibility result by Armknecht et al. [1] for Narrow-Strong privacy and reader authentication, when mutual authentication is considered.
Plaintext-Awareness
Plaintext-awareness states that if an adversary is able to produce a valid ciphertext, then she should know the corresponding plaintext. Formalizing this notion has proven to be a non-trivial task [4, 5, 6, 8, 18] . In the end, several notions of plaintext-awareness were defined, such as, PA1, PA2, PA1+, and PA2+.
The difference between PA1 and PA2 lies in the attacker's ability to get ciphertexts from external sources. In the settings of PA2, there is an oracle P (aux),
called plaintext creator and such that, on each query, it picks a message at random (or possibly according to a distribution partially defined by its input aux).
The adversary can query Enc pk (P (aux)). Any ciphertext obtained through this oracle is added to a list CList, the list of ciphertexts for which the adversary does not know the corresponding plaintexts. The essence of plaintext-awareness is the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm A (which construction may depend on A), called plaintext extractor that successfully decrypts any ciphertext given by the adversary that was not returned by Enc pk (P (aux)). To carry out the extraction, A is given the view of A (which includes CList and the random coins of A) and the target ciphertext c to be decrypted for c ∈ CList.
To formalize information coming from external sources, Dent [18] extended PA1 to PA1+ for adversaries who can get hold of uniformly distributed bits from an external source. Later, Birkett and Dent [8] introduced the analog notion of PA2+ for PA2 plaintext-awareness. These last two notions were proven to be equivalent under the condition that the encryption scheme is IND-CPA [8] . PA1+ was also shown to imply PA2+ for simulatable encryption schemes [7] . We extend them to PA1++ and PA2++ when using any inverse-simulatable source. 
Note that PA1++ (resp. PA2++) plaintext-awareness trivially implies PA1+ (resp. PA2+). Actually, we can even show equivalence. 
Recalling that B (pk, ·, view B ) is indistinguishable from a decryption oracle to A, we deduce that A is a valid plaintext extractor. In other words,
This concludes the proof.
The following corollary results from the combination of Theorem 9 with the equivalence result between PA2+ and PA2 [7] , under the assumption that the scheme is IND-CPA secure.
Corollary 10. If an encryption scheme is IND-CPA and PA2 plaintext-aware, then it is PA1++ plaintext-aware.
Strong Privacy is Possible
In this section, we show that using the new definition of blinders, we can achieve Strong privacy using plaintext-aware encryption schemes.
We consider the PKC protocol in Fig. 1 . It has already been used by Vaudenay [34] to achieve Narrow-Strong privacy under the assumption that the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure, our result requires PA1+ plaintextawareness from the encryption scheme. Naturally, since our definition of security is unchanged from the original model, IND-CCA security for the encryption scheme is sufficient to prove security [34] . In Section A, we have shown that IND-CCA security alone is insufficient to prove this kind of result.
Note that in light of Corollary 10, we can implement the encryption scheme by a simulatable, PA1+ plaintext-aware, and IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme. Since the Cramer-Shoup [14] and Kurosawa-Desmedt [26] encryption schemes satisfy all these notions [7, 24] (under certain extractor-based assumptions), any of these two schemes can be used.
Proof. First note that by Theorem 9, the encryption scheme is PA1++ plaintextaware. Correctness is trivially induced by the correctness of the encryption scheme while security follows from IND-CCA security and [34, Theorem 19] .
Therefore, we only need to prove privacy. To conduct the proof, we consider are computationally indistinguishable, we deduce that B is indeed a full blinder for A. So, the scheme is Strong private. Game 0. Let Game 0 be the privacy game played by the adversary A 0 . Game 1. We let Game 1 denote the privacy game performed by an adversary who simulates every RESULT on a session π with a transcript (a, c) , such that c that has been obtained by a previous c = SENDTAG(vtag, a ) query. If a = a , for sure c does not decrypt to something containing a, so the answer to RESULT(π) must be 0. The simulation is easy and perfect. In the other case, that is, if a = a , the decryption of c will be parsed to a matching challenge a and some entry ID K ID which is in the database if and only if vtag is legitimate. Fortunately, the blinder has access to this latter information as it is returned in the response of the DRAWTAG oracle query drawing vtag. Again, the simulation is easy and perfect. This fully defines B 1 At this point, we can legitimately consider an adversary A 2 who makes no SENDTAG queries.
Game 3. We now simulate all remaining RESULT queries. To do so, we construct an adversary E playing the PA1++ game. The way B 3 simulates RESULT will come from the E construction. E takes the public key then simulates A 2 interacting with the RFID system.
Recall that, like in Game 2, the algorithms and oracles of the scheme do not depend on the secret key, except for the RESULT queries that will be treated hereafter. We let E simulate the RFID system to A 2 , handling her queries as follow:
-Assuming w.l.o.g. that session identifiers are based on a counter, LAUNCH is deterministically computed by E. -Upon a CREATETAG(ID) query from A 2 , E inserts (ID, −) in a table DB 1 if the query asks for a legitimate tag. Otherwise, it inserts (ID, −) in a table DB 0 . This is deterministic.
-E simulates SENDREADER → a queries by asking the oracle O S to sample from the uniform distribution over {0, 1} α . It then forwards the received answer a to A 2 . This is non-deterministic but only requires uniformly distributed independent bits.
-DRAWTAG(Samp) queries are handled by asking the randomness oracle O S to sample from the distribution specified by Samp to get one or more random ID. If any of the returned identifiers corresponds to a drawn tag, E outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it generates, deterministically and for each returned vtag 1 , b 1 , . . . , vtag n , b n ) to A 2 . This is non-deterministic but requires inverse samplable distributions.
-CORRUPT(vtag) makes E reveal ID = T (vtag). Moreover, E looks for the entry (ID, K ID ) in DB 0 and DB 1 . If that corresponding entry contains a K ID different from − , then it returns it. Otherwise, it queries O S to sample from the uniform distribution over {0, 1} κ and assigns the answer to K ID . It subsequently updates the entry (ID, −) to (ID, K ID ) and returns this last pair as its answer. We further assume that whenever the tag ID is a legitimate one, E inserts the entry (ID, K T (vtag) ) in a table T E . This is non-deterministic but only requires uniformly distributed independent bits. Note that noncorrupted tags have no preset K ID key.
-To simulate the RESULT(π) oracle for a reader instance π with transcript (a, c), E sends c to the decryption oracle, checks that the recovered plaintext is of the form ID K ID a, that it matches a ID K ID ∈ DB 1 . (Note that this implies that tag ID, has been corrupted, and has key K ID .) If this is the case, the answer to RESULT must be 1, otherwise, the simulated answer is 0. Note that when the output of the E regarding a RESULT query is 1, the genuine RESULT query would also have answered 1. So, this simulation is correct.
Errors in the simulation only occur when E predicts 0 and the genuine RE-SULT query would also have outputted 1 in a session without matching conversation. Clearly, the failure of one of E's simulations corresponds to the happening of the event that there is a legitimate and uncorrupted tag which was identified by a session π which received a c which was not produced by 
At the same time,
Step 3 fails when the event E occurs, so using triangle inequalities we conclude that
Recalling that E occurs with negligible probability and that the scheme is PA1++ plaintext-aware, the quantity above becomes negligible. Hence, B 3 describes a successful blinder for the RESULT oracle. 
Conclusion
We updated the Vaudenay model for RFID privacy. Our model now makes it possible to achieve strong privacy. Actually, we proved that the regular PKC protocol with an IND-CCA and PA1+ secure cryptosystem achieves it. We have further shown that IND-CCA security alone could fail to reach this level of privacy. This shows a separation between our privacy model and the one from [22] . However, the question whether this separation is significant remains open.
A IND-CCA Security is not Sufficient for Strong Privacy
We define (KeyGen 1 , Enc 1 , Dec 1 ), a variant of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [20] as follows. 
.
Note that z in the public key is unused. Further note that z · Enc 1 pk 1 (b) mod N is a valid encryption of either b orb = 1 − b depending on
which is unknown for someone holding the public key. Let (KeyGen 0 , Enc 0 , Dec 0 ) denote an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme, we define (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) as follows.
-KeyGen. Run (sk 0 , pk 0 ) ← KeyGen 0 (1 k ) and (sk 1 , pk 1 ) ← KeyGen 1 (1 k ). The scheme's key pair is pk = (pk 0 , pk 1 ) and sk = (sk 0 , sk 1 ).
-Encrypt. To encrypt, set Enc pk (x) = Enc . To figure out whether this encrypts x orx would require to solve the quadratic residuosity problem, which is supposedly a hard problem.
Consider the PKC protocol of Fig. 1 using the above IND-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme.
Finally, the following Strong adversary defeats privacy. Clearly, an adversary outputs 1 if and only if ( z p ) = +1. Therefore, a blinder that follows the same distribution would break the quadratic residuosity problem, i.e., the problem of distinguishing quadratic residues from non-quadratic residues. So, the PKC protocol based on this cryptosystem is strong-private in the model from [22] but is not in our model, assuming that quadratic residuosity is a hard problem. This proves the separation between privacy from [22] and our strong privacy. Indeed, we have shown that the PKC protocol based on an IND-CCA cryptosystem may still leak some non-simulatable information although it is strong private in the sense of [22] .
